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Daiwa Bank Scandal in New York: Its
Causes, Significance, and Lessons in
the International Societyt
MitsuruMisawa*
ABSTRACT

The New York Daiwa Bank scandal, which involved
Daiwa Bank's concealment of $1.1 billion in losses from the
illegal funding of U.S. Treasury bonds and the diversion of
another $100 million in losses incurred by Daiwa Bank Trust
Company, resulted in the most severe economic penalties
ever imposed by the United States against Japan. These
penalties included the termination of Daiwa Bank's U.S.
operations and the reinforcement of the increased rates at
which Japanese banks can borrow U.S. currency-the
"Japanese premium." In addition, the Daiwa Bank case
substantiatedan internationaldistrust of Japanesefinancial
institutions, which are closely aligned with their governmental
regulator,the Ministry of Finance. Despite the internationallybased opposition to Japan's regulatory and banking
practices, Japanese authorities view the retaliatory steps
taken by the United States as excessively harsh.
In this Article, the author compares the differing United
States and Japanese reactions to the New York Daiwa Bank
scandal on legal, economic, and sociological levels. Based on

tEditor's Note:

As a service to our readers, the Editorial Board normally

checks cited material for both "blue book" form and substance. This article,
however, relies extensively on sources available only in Japanese. These sources
are identified in the first full citation as "Japanese-language source." The
Editorial Board has not translated these sources and they have only been
checked for "blue book" form.
*Mitsuru Misawa is a Professor of Finance at the College of Business
Administration, University of Hawaii. He worked at the Industrial Bank of Japan
(IBJ) for 30 years and served as a member of the board of directors at the leasing
headquarters in Tokyo and as president of IBJ Leasing, (USA) in New York. His
assignments included various investment banking operations in New York and
Tokyo. He joined the faculty of University of Hawaii in August, 1996. LL.B.,
1960. Tokyo University; LL.M., 1964, Harvard University; M.B.A., 1965,
University of Hawaii; Ph.D., 1967, University of Michigan.
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his analysis, the author concludes that cultural differences
between the United States and Japan lie at the heart of the
scandalous proportions of the Daiwa Bank incident,
Furthermore, the author believes that the Daiwa Bank case
offers an important lesson for Japanese companies with
internationaloperations: "When in Rome, do as the Romans
do." According to the author, Japanese banks and other
industries will eventually earn the trust of the international
market by abiding by foreign laws and improving Japan's
regulatorypractices.
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INTRODUCTION

An incredible incident was disclosed recently at Daiwa Bank's
New York Branch: one of its employees had been illegally trading
U.S. Treasury bonds for over eleven years without detection,
causing the bank an accumulated loss of $1.1 billion. Since then,
this incident has mushroomed into an international scandal,
resulting in civil, criminal, and administrative liabilities in both
the United States and Japan. There has never been an economic
incident with such a tremendous international impact between
Japan and the United States.
The concerns about the incident expressed by supervising
authorities of both countries, as well as by stakeholders, such as
corresponding foreign banks and the Bank's stockholders,
resulted in specific actions being taken to manage the situation in
its aftermath. Those actions, in return, caused further questions
on both sides of the Pacific. It seems that all of these opinions,

actions, and questions stem from the differences in Japanese and
American social systems and thought patterns.
For example, Daiwa Bank (hereinafter Daiwa or the Bank)
and the Ministry of Finance (hereinafter MOF), the authority
within the Japanese government that supervises the Daiwa Bank,
do not acknowledge any fault in the matter despite the fact that
the incident drew severe criticism internationally and caused
Japan to lose credibility. Why? Is there really a difference in the
legal systems of the two countries that makes an act illegal in the
United States and legal in Japan? Are there any conceptual
differences between the systems of the two countries as to a
corporation's responsibility for the disclosure of important
information regarding its performance?
In addition, the mutually supportive relationship between the
Japanese government and Japanese industry--often called the
"convoy" system-has long been accepted by the people of Japan.
The rest of the world, however, has become more suspicious of
this relationship. Accordingly, the Daiwa incident caused the
MOF to lose its credibility as a competent authority in the eyes of
international observers. Is such a relationship unacceptable in
international society? Does the MOF need an overhaul?
Furthermore, Japan disapproves of the retaliatory steps
For instance, the U.S. Federal
taken by the United States.
has
ordered Daiwa Bank to cease
Reserve Board (hereinafter FRB)
its operations in the United States. Some in Japan considered
this action to be too severe. What caused this decision by the
The incident also
FRB? What are the legal grounds for it?

induced a so-called "Japanese premium" that heavily penalizes all
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Japanese banks by inflicting on them a burdensome increase In
interest rates. Why is such a penalty inflicted not just on Daiwa,
but on all Japanese banks? Are there any precedents for such
action?
Finally,
Daiwa's
stockholders
recently
brought
a
representative action against the Bank regarding this incident.
Such an action has been imported from the United States and
has not yet become popular in Japan. Stockholders' actions
against corporations in Japan, and the meaning of such an action
in this case bears review.
This case contains a broad range of complex issues,
encompassing the government and business circles of both
countries. Therefore, the method of analysis for these Issues
requires an extensive multi-disciplinary approach based on
jurisprudential, economical, sociological, and international
comparative studies.
This Article seeks to provide such a multi-disciplinary
analysis. Part I of this Article reviews the factual background of
the Daiwa Bank Scandal, explaining both the Bank's legal trading
of U.S. Treasury bonds and the diversion of another $100 million
in losses incurred by the Daiwa Bank Trust Company. Part II
examines the legal actions taken against Daiwa Bank by the
United States and suggests that such actions fall within the
general trend of increased supervision by U.S. authorities over
foreign banks. In Part III, this Article compares and contrasts the
duty of disclosure under United States and Japanese law. Part IV
of this Article discusses the reporting responsibilities of the MOF.
Part V offers general improvements for the Japanese banking
industry, concluding that both autonomous responsibility
principles and free market doctrine are necessary to further
Japanese banking in the international market. In Part VI, this
Article discusses past suits and the subsequent standard of
directors' liability and applies this standard to the Daiwa Bank
suit. Part VII explains and reviews the Japanese premium.
Finally, this Article concludes that further improvement of the
relations between the United States and Japan requires a
consensus regarding international business between them.

II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND OF THE DAIWA BANK SCANDAL

The Daiwa Bank scandal involves two major cases: (1) the
illegal trading of U.S. Treasury bonds, which resulted in the loss
of $1.1 billion, and (2) the "loss diversion" of about $100 million
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by Daiwa Bank Trust Company, a New York subsidiary of Daiwa
Bank.

A. Case 1: The Concealment of DaiwaBank's Illegal Trading
Losses
Daiwa Bank' disclosed on September 26, 1995, that a Bank

Vice-President, Toshihide Iguchi, 2 who was in charge of securities
trading and control at its New York Branch, had been selling
securities that the Bank had in its custody to cover up the loss

created by his own unauthorized, unlisted trading of U.S.
Treasury bonds. His trading had caused Iguchi's bank to lose a
total of approximately $1.1 billion (approximately Y110 billion).
Iguchi's cover up consisted of the concealment of transaction
confirmation statements and the forgery of securities balance
certificates. 3 The amount of4 Daiwa's loss is among the highest in
the history of similar cases.
Although the loss in this case was caused by the criminal
conduct of an individual, the multiple review of transactions, one
of the basic rules for all financial institutions, did not work in this
It is astonishing that this illegal trading remained
case.
undetected for 6eleven years. 5 Thus, it is important to see how it
was concealed.
When a bank trades U.S. Treasury bonds, securities
companies-the bank's counterpart in the transactions-normally
send transaction confirmation statements to the transaction
control section of the bank. Iguchi, however, instructed the
1.

Daiwa Bank is the 17th largest bank in the world with about $318

billion in assets and more than 9,000 employees. The corporation stock is listed

in the Tokyo Stock Exchange. Established in 1918. its main office is located at 21, Bingo-Machi, 2-Chome, Chuo-ku, Osaka-shi, Osaka Japan. TOKYO KEIZAi,
JAPAN COMPANY HANDBOOK 1100 (1996).
On September 26, 1995, the Federal Bureau of Investigations (FBI)
2.
arrested Toshihide Iguchi (age 44), a former employee of Daiwa Bank's New York
Branch. See Daiwa Bank's Huge Loss, 30,000 Unauthorized Transactions; FBI
Announces Arrest of Daiwa Bank's Former Employee, NIHON KEIzAI SHIMBUN, Sept.

27, 1995, at 1 (Japanese-language source).
For details of the concealment by Daiwa Bank, see Yoshiyuki
3.
Watanabe, Daiwa Bank Conceals Wrongdoings, BUNGEI SHUNJU, Dec. 1995, at 94104 (Japanese-language source).
See Infra Figure 1.
4.
The incident became known to the management of the bank through
5.
Iguchi's confession letter dated July 24, 1995 and addressed to the president.
For details of the confession letter, see Exclusive Publication of Defendant
Toshlhlde Iguchl's Confession, BUNGEI SHUNJU, Jan. 1996, at 112-31 (Japaneselanguage source).
See supra note 3; see also infra Figure 2.
6.
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securities companies to send those statements directly to him.
He also hid the true securities balance statements sent from

custodial banks which held the traded Treasury bonds and
delivered forged statements to the custodial control section of the
Bank.
How could this happen? First, Iguchi was in charge of both
securities trading and securities control. Second, he held these
positions in the section that traded Treasury bonds for eleven
years. It is quite unusual, even among Japanese banks, for an
employee to remain essentially in one position for such a long
period. Third, although it is customary for bank employees in the
United States and Europe to take a long vacation once a year
while another employee handles his or her job,7 Iguchi never took
any long vacations during the eleven-year period. Finally, with
regard to market risk management, it is customary for Japanese
banks to set up a trading limit for each trader. In this case,
however, the Bank failed to detect the loss, which substantially
exceeded the capacity of its New York Branch. While it is granted
that the loss was covered up by unlisted or out-of-books
transactions, the management's responsibility for the lack of more
effective and stringent control is indisputable.
B. Case 2: The Concealment of Daiwa Bank Trust Company's
Losses
In the course of investigating Iguchi's illegal trading losses,
U.S. authorities found that the Bank had been hiding another
huge loss. Daiwa Bank Trust Company (hereinafter Daiwa Bank
Trust),8 a New York trust company and subsidiary of Daiwa Bank,
Ltd., had generated large losses that it had been concealing. 9
Daiwa Bank Trust developed a latent loss of $31 million in

1984 as a result of its unlisted trading of U.S. Treasury bonds. In
an effort to make up the loss, Daiwa Bank Trust continued to

7.
See supra note 2, at 3.
8.
Daiwa Bank Trust Company was established in New York in 1977 as a
wholly-owned subsidiary of The Daiwa Bank, Ltd. With capital of $86,750,000, it
has been operating mainly in the areas of corporate pension funds and petty
loans of banking operations. The Bank will be closed as a result of the recent
incidents. It currently employs 75 of which 66 are local employees. Daiwa Bank
Considering Reorganization; Plans to Integrate/Close U.S. Trust Subsidiary and
Other U.S. and European Operations by End of This Month, NIHON KEIZAI SHIMBUN,

Oct. 13, 1995, at 7 (Japanese-language source).
9.
See Infra Figure 3; see also Illegal Accounting Operations Using Two
Subsidiaries to Hide U.S. Daiwa Bank Trust Company's Loss; Suspected of Profit
Transfer, NIHON KEIZAI SHIMBUN, Oct. 20, 1995, at 1 (Japanese-language source).
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trade Treasury bonds; however, the loss continued to increase
until it reached the staggering amount of $97 million at the end of
September 1987. In 1986, Daiwa Bank, Ltd. established a paper
company-Plaza International-in the Cayman Islands, a
notorious tax haven, and the loss was transferred from Daiwa
Bank Trust to this newly formed company.
The entire loss was subsequently transferred to another
paper company, New Hope International, which was established
in September 1987, also in the Cayman Islands. The technique
used was for New Hope International to purchase Treasury bonds
from Plaza International at the market price and then sell them
back to Plaza International at the book value in order to cancel its
loss. Under U.S. securities laws, this operation is considered an
illegal transfer of profits or a diversion of loss.
In the meantime, a total of $40 million was invested from six
companies, including Super Prime and PS America, both of which
were paper companies created in the Cayman Islands by Daiwa
Bank. Other subsidiaries, including Daiwa Overseas Finance
(Hong Kong) and Daiwa Bank Trust, also provided loans to New

Hope International.

The total amount of loans provided by the

Daiwa Bank group as a whole was $330 million.
All of these "cover-up" operations were done without any
reports to the authorities of Japan and the United States. In
addition, such actions raise a tax question of an illegal transfer of
profits to overseas bases.
Moreover, there is a question of whether Daiwa Bank is to be
held liable under respondeat superior for Iguchi's illegal
transactions. While the prosecutor alleged that Daiwa Bank was
liable under respondeat superior for the damages its customers
and the U.S. financial authorities suffered due to illegal
transactions, Daiwa Bank alleged that the case was a personal
wrongdoing committed by the defendant Iguchi, and that, "the
bank was a victim and was not responsible for the defendant
Iguchi's misconduct." 10

See Daiwa Bank Has Employer's Responsibility; Federal Prosecutor's
10.
Rebuttal Stresses Legitimacy of Accusation, NIHON KEIZAI SHIMBUN, Feb. 13, 1996,
at 3 (Japanese-language source). There is a difference between Japanese and
U.S. laws regarding respondeat superior, causing a difference of opinion between
U.S. authorities and Daiwa Bank in this case. According to common law principle
operating in the United States, an employer is held liable for the conduct of its
employee that results in damages to third parties during the course of his or her
employment, regardless of whether or not the employer was at fault. According to
Japanese law, an employer is liable only when the employer was negligent in the
selection and supervision of the employee. However, Japanese law places more
responsibility on the employer in its interpretation of an employee's course of
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Figure 4 in this Article provides a chronological list of the
events in Case 1 and Case 2.
It is clear from this list that
systematic concealment efforts were made for the last eleven
years. Even so, the Bank asserts that it is not guilty, as a person
or corporation, of any criminal offenses in both cases."
As expected, however, Daiwa Bank recently agreed to a plea
bargain with the prosecutor to settle the case by admitting some
wrongdoing and paying a penalty. 12 It admitted wrongdoing as to
sixteen of the allegations,
most notably the intentional
concealment and conspiracy regarding a loss, which were
regarded as the center of the accusations.
Daiwa paid $340
million (approximately 35.6 billion yen) in penalties. 13 As a result
of this plea bargain, the case involving the Bank itself was
settled. 14 However, since plea bargaining does not exist under
Japanese law, there has been some strong criticism in Japanese
economic circles of this mode of settlement by Daiwa Bank,
arguing that the bank should have fought to the end to clarify its
role in the matter.' 5
How this bargaining will affect the
stockholders' representative action in Japan will be closely
watched.

employment. MINPO (Civil Code), Law No. 89 of 1898 and Law No. 9 of 1898, art.
715 (Japanese-language source).
11.
Faced with this fact, Daiwa Bank claims the following: (1) that its
former New York Branch general manager is not guilty of misprision of felony, for
which he has been arrested and indicted in Federal District Court of the Southern
District of New York, and (2) that the allegations made against the Bank as a
corporation of misprision of felony and obstruction of the examination of the
financial institution by the authorities are inappropriate.
Former NY Branch
ManagerClaimed Not Guilty; Defendant's Lawyers of Daiwa Bank Case Claim Main
Case Itself is Illegitimate as Well, NIHON KEIZAI SHIMBUN, Nov. 22, 1995, at 4
(Japanese-language source).
12.
For details of this plea bargain, see Daiwa Bank Seeks Judicial
Settlement; Admits Huge Loss and Conspiracy; Federal Prosecutor Charges $35.6
Billion Penalty for 16 Accounts Including Delayed Report; Affected by MOF's
Intention, NIHON KEIzAI SHIMBUN. Feb. 29, 1996, at 1 (Japanese-language source).
13.
Id.
14.
Id.
15.
Id.
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Fig. 2 Unlisted Trading of U.S. Treasury Bonds by Daiwa Bank

4

Normal Flow
Actual Flow by unlisted trading
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Method of Hiding Losses Generated by Daiwa Bank Trust

Note: (1)
(2)

All of these (asterisked) paper companies were established on
the Cayman Islands.
(L) denotes loan.
(I) denotes investment
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Fig. 4 Chronological List of Events Leading to Enormous Losses
at Daiwa Bank
Date
1984

(Case 1)
Iguchi started unlisted
(out of books) trading of
Treasury bonds

1992

Concealed the lack of
separation between the
Treasury bond trading
and custodial
operations during
examination by New

(Case 2)
Daiwa's U.S.
subsidiary, Daiwa
Bank Trust,
developed losses in
unlisted (out of
books) trading of
Treasury bonds

York FRB

1993

Daiwa Bank submitted
to New York FRB a false
report based on
concealment activities
Daiwa Bank
completed the
process using
separate companies
to cover up the loss
created by its U.S.
subsidiary.

1994

July 24, 1995
July 28
August 8

Pres. Fujita received a
confession letter from
Iguchi
Managing Dir. Yamaji
sent to United States to
investigate
Fujita reported the
existence of Iguchi's
confession letter to Dir.
Gen. Nishimura of
Banking Bureau, MOF

1996]
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September 14

September 18

September 26
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Daiwa Bank reported
the outline of the
incident to MOF
Vice Pres. Yasui
explained the incident
to Vice Pres. Fukui of
the Bank of Japan
Daiwa Bank made an
official report to
Japanese and U.S.
authorities
Daiwa announced the

above incident at a
press conference
October 6

October 9

Daiwa reported the
loss of Daiwa Bank
Trust to Japanese
and U.S. authorities
Resignation of Pres.
Fujita was
announced at a press
conference.
The above-mentioned
loss was also
disclosed.

Source: City Bank's Reorganization Issues Focusing on Daiwa
Bank Case; Huge Loss Shakes Reorganization Base with
Resurfacing Merger Rumors, NIHON KEIZAI SHIMBUN, Oct. 10, 1995,
at 8 (Japanese-language source).

1036

VANDERBILT JOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW

[Vol. 29:1023

III. U.S. ADMINISTRATIVE LEGAL ACTIONS AGAINST DAIWA BANK

On November 2, 1995, the FRB ordered Daiwa Bank to close
its branches and terminate all operations in the United States
within ninety days. 16 Moreover, for the next three years, Daiwa
Bank is obligated to submit a petition in writing if either the Bank
or its affiliates wish to reopen operations in the United States.
This petition is then subject to the discretionary control of U.S.
authorities. 17 In practical terms, this means that Daiwa Bank
has been completely banished from the United States. This

action by U.S. authorities is viewed as an "abnormally" severe

punishment in Japan. 18 This Article next examines whether this

Japanese claim has any merit by reviewing the legal grounds of
the FRB's action and the judgment that undergirded it.
According to the International Banking Act (IBA), 19 there are
two grounds on which FRB can base its decision of the
deportation of Daiwa Bank. The first possible reason is that
Daiwa Bank did not obey the supervision or regulation of the
MOF. 20 Since Daiwa Bank had been consulting with the MOF, it
16.
Senjin Kishi, Fault of MOF Which Betrayed World and Japan; Japan
Financial Administration, Far Apart From Anglo-Saxon Logic, ECONOMIST (Japan),
Dec. 5, 1995, at 40-42.
17.
Id.
18.
U.S. Intensifies CriticismAgainst MOF; MOF Should Not Discuss It's Role,
SHuKAN ToYo KEIZAI, Dec. 2, 1995, at 22 (Japanese-language source).
19.
12 U.S.C. § 611 (1994).
20.
See Sections 7(e) and 10(b) of the International Banking Act, added in
1991 as amendments:
The Board may order a foreign bank to terminate the activities of such
branch, agency, or subsidiary, if the Boar'd finds that(A) the foreign bank is not subject to comprehensive supervision or
regulation on a consolidated basis by the appropriate authorities in its
home country; or
(B)(i) there is reasonable cause to believe that such foreign bank, or any
affiliate of such foreign bank, has committed a violation of law or engaged
in an unsafe or unsound banking practice in the United States; and
as a result of such violation or practice, the continued operation of the
foreign bank's branch, agency, or commercial lending company subsidiary
in the United States would not be consistent with the public interest or
with the purposes of this Act, the Bank Holding Company Act of 1956 or
the Federal Deposit Insurance Act.

12 U.S.C. § 3107(b) (1994).
And, in case of termination of a Federal branch of agency:
The Board may transmit to the Comptroller of the Currency a
recommendation that the license of any Federal branch or Federal agency
of a foreign bank be terminated in accordance with section 4(I) [12 U.S.C.
§ 3102(1)1 if the Board has reasonable cause to believe that such foreign
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is unlikely that this was the reason for the FRB's decision. We
have to assume that the FRB's action was based on the second
reason: Daiwa Bank's operations included those that can be
2
considered unsafe and unsound banking practices. '
First, Daiwa Bank violated the law that imposes certain
reporting obligations. Daiwa Bank failed to file a criminal referral

report within thirty days after the date of detection, the period
defined in Regulation H, 2 2 in both Case I and Case 2.23 It seems
inconceivable, however, that the FRB decided to expel Daiwa
Bank permanently from the U.S. solely on the ground that the

Bank violated this reporting rule. The punishment for a violation
of the reporting duty alone should entail, at most, a fine imposed
on the Bank or a criminal penalty against the individual(s)
involved.24

bank or any affiliate of such foreign bank has engaged in conduct for
which the activities of any State branch or agency may be terminated.
12 U.S.C. § 3105(e)(5) (1994).
21.
Id.
22.
FRB Rule on Reports of Crimes and Suspected Crimes, 12 C.F.R. §
208.20 (1996).
23.
12 C.F.R. § 208.20 (1996) provides:
A state member bank shall fie a criminal referral report . . . in every
situation where the State member bank suspects one of its directors,
officers, employees, agents, or other institution-affiliated parties of having
committed or aided in the commission of a crime. . . . A state member
bank shall file the report.., no later than 30 calendar days after the date
of detection of the loss or the known or suspected criminal violation or
activity. If no suspect has been identified within 30 calendar days after
the date of the detection of the loss or the known, attempted or suspected
criminal violation or activity, reporting may be delayed an additional 30
calendar days or until a suspect has been identified; but in no case shall
reporting of known or suspected crimes be delayed more than 60 calendar
days after the date of the detection of the loss or the known, attempted or

suspected criminal violation or activity.

When a report requirement Is

triggered by the identification of a suspect or group of suspects, the
reporting period commences with the identification of each suspect or
group of suspects.
24.

Any foreign bank, or any office or subsidiary of a foreign bank, that-

(A) fails to make, submit, or publish such reports or information as may
be required under this Act or under regulations prescribed by the Board or
the Comptroller of the Currency pursuant to this Act, within the time
period specified by such agency; or
(B) submits or publishes any false or misleading report or information,.
shall be subject to a penalty of not more than $20,000 for each day during
which such failure continues or such false or misleading information is
not corrected.
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In addition to the reporting rule violation mentioned above,
Daiwa Bank committed two additional violations. 25 In Case 1, the

Bank had been making false reports to the authorities for the past
eleven years in order to conceal the unlawful trading. In addition,
it also tried to hide the facts of this situation after management
received Iguchi's confession. 26 In Case 2, the Bank conducted a
systematic concealment operation regarding the loss generated by
Daiwa Bank Trust. It is assumed that when the FRB discovered
these two violations, in addition to the reporting rule violation, it
concluded that the Bank had
been conducting an "unsafe and
27
unsound banking practice."
In the background of the FRB's decision is the Bank of Credit
and Commerce International (BCCI) case. 2 8 BCCI was notorious
for its underground activities, such as drug money laundering,
and was called "the world's dirtiest bank." In 1991, British
12 U.S.C. § 3110(c) (1994):
Whoever, with the intent to deceive, to gain financially, or to cause
financial gain or loss to any person, knowingly violates any provision of
this Act or any regulation or order issued by the appropriate Federal
banking agency under this Act shall be imprisoned not more than 5 years
or fined not more than $1,000,000 for each day during which a violation
continues, or both.
25.
Per the complaint of the U.S. prosecution authorities. See FormerN.Y.
Branch Manager claimed Not Guilty; Defendant's Lawyers of Daiwa Bank Case
Claim Main Case Itse!f is Illegitimate as Well, NIHON KEIzAI SHIMBUN, Nov. 22, 1995.
at 4 (Japanese-language source).
26.
Id.
27.
Id.
28.
The BCCI (Bank of Credit and Commerce International) group is a
multinational group of financial institutions having 365 offices in 69 countries
around the world and was one of the largest Arabian financial institutions. The
BCCI group was established by a Pakistani businessman in 1972 and the largest
group of stockholders consist of the Emirate of Abu Dhabi and the people related
to its government. BCCI Holding, the holding company of the BCCI group, has a
token head office in Luxembourg for the purpose of registration and the actual
head office in London.
The BCCI group had been suspected of drug money laundering for some time.
When its performance deteriorated due to failures of loans without collateral as
well as dealing failures, it covered up its settlements with window dressing.
On July 5, 1991, having been convinced of BCCI's long term window dressing
settlement practices, Bank of England, in coordination with the financial
authorities of the United States (where First American Bank, Its subsidiary In a
practical sense, exists), ordered BCCI to halt its operations and froze Its assets In
each country in order to prevent its customers run on the bank and the insiders
from hiding its assets.
For details of the history of the BCCI Group and the BCCI case, see BCCI
Case's Full Picture; Other Countries' Responses and Developments In Japan, KINYU
HoHMu JijYou (Financial and Legal Affairs), Nov. 25, 1991, at. 4-12 (Japaneselanguage source).
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authorities ordered BCCI to stop its operations, which practically
forced BCCI into bankruptcy. In the United States, authorities
found that BCCI was illegally lending to one of the nation's largest
banks, Washington, D.C.-based First American Bank. As a
result, the United States fined BCCI $200 million and
permanently expelled9 from U.S. banking nine people who were
2
involved in the case.
In contrast to the industry case of Daiwa Bank, however, no
expulsion actions were taken against BCCI itself by U.S.
authorities. BCCI, however, stopped its operations on its own
initiative and retreated from the United States. From the FRB's
standpoint, the most serious violation by BCCI was the false
report it made to U.S. authorities when it bought First American
Bank. As a result of this incident, a revision of the IBA was
introduced in 1991 to enhance the FRB's authority substantially,
giving it powers such as that of canceling licenses and examining
30
all foreign bank branches in the United States.
The order to terminate operations that was given to Daiwa
Bank is the first action of its kind taken by the FRB since the
revision of the IBA in 1991. While some people think that this
action is too severe, it is neither unusual nor unduly harsh if one
understands the trend towards increased supervision by U.S.

authorities over foreign banks.
IV.

DISCLOSURE REQUIREMENTS AND DUTIES OF BANKS AND
DIRECTORS: UNITED STATES V. JAPAN

Although they knew about the huge losses described above,
the management of Daiwa Bank delayed disclosure of that
information to the FRB for a substantial period. The FRB thought
that this delay was a serious violation of the reporting rule under
the IBA. In addition, Daiwa Bank may have been required to
disclose this important information, which is logically expected to
influence the securities market, to stockholders as well as to the
general public, which includes stockholders. While this is not the
direct concern of the FRB, if the management of Daiwa Bank felt
it had a responsibility towards stockholders to disclose, it should
have reported such information to United States and Japanese
From this standpoint,
authorities at the appropriate time.
whether the Bank and its directors were obligated to disclose
such information to the stockholders is deeply related to the
29.
30.

See KMNYu HoHMu JIJYo (Financial and Legal Affairs), supra note 28.
See supra note 20.
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reporting duty to the FRB.
Furthermore, the Bank and its
directors may have been responsible for the disclosure of
important information under the Securities and Exchange Law of
Japan, as Daiwa Bank's stock was traded on Japan's stock
31
market.
What is notable here is that Daiwa Bank asked a third party
to purchase its stock without disclosing the concealed losses,.
thus causing damage to this third party. Asahi Mutual Life
Insurance Co. (Asahi Seimei), a major life insurance company in
Japan, 3 2 bought a large sum of Daiwa Bank's stock shortly before
the incident was disclosed. 3 3 Asahi Seimei commented later that
"the stock purchase was made on the request of Daiwa, and it Is
34
regretful that the loss disclosure was not made."
The facts of this case reveal that a "director of Daiwa Bank
urged Asahi Seimei to buy Daiwa Bank's stock from the open
market without disclosing an important piece of information
35
regarding Daiwa Bank that might affect the market negatively.
Asahi Seimei already owned 2.7 million shares of Daiwa Bank
stock at that point. 3 6
Asahi Seimei decided, however, that
additional shares would be helpful to enhance its business in the
Kansai District, where Daiwa Bank had its head office, and thus,
bought a total of 5 million shares in six installments between late
August, and late September, 1995, immediately before the
disclosure of this incident. 37 During this period, Daiwa Bank

shares traded at slightly over 800 yen per share;

the price

subsequently dropped to about 600 yen per share, causing the

31.
If Daiwa Bank's stocks were traded on the U.S. market, or if Daiwa
Bank had been issuing its securities in the United States, so that there were
stockholders in the United States, then the U.S. Securities Acts would have been
applied. However, that was not the case.
32.
The fifth largest life insurance company in Japan.
1995 revenue:
1,960 billion yen. Head office: 1-7-3 Nishi-Shinjuku, ShinJuku-ku, Tokyo. ToYo
KEIzAY, KAIsHA SHIKI Ho (Corporate Quarterly Report) 1591 (1996) (Japaneselanguage source).
33.
Daiwa Bank's Huge Loss Case, Disclosure Tardiness Undeniable;
Finding of Preferred Stock Issuance After Former Bank Employee's Confession
Causes Distrust in Domestic and Overseas Markets, NIHON KEIZAI SHIMBUN, Nov. 29,
1995, at 3 (Japanese-language source).
34.
Id. Although a company is allowed to own its own stocks in the form of
Treasury Stocks in the United States, it is forbidden to do so in Japan. SHOHE
(Commercial Code), Law No. 48 of 1899, art. 210. Therefore, when a company
wants to ask the third party to obtain the company's stocks or increase the
number of its stocks the third party owns, it is a common practice in Japan to ask
the third party to purchase the company's stocks through the stock market.
35.
Id.
36.
Id.
37.
Id.
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insurance company to incur an unrealized loss of Y650 million
(about $6.5 million).3 8
The next question to be examined is whether Daiwa Bank
had a duty to disclose this important information to stockholders,
including Asahi Seimei, according to the Securities and Exchange
Law of Japan. When a director discloses an important piece of
information about the company, he or she may either disclose it
or make the company disclose it. In either case, the director
must always choose between the following duties: (1) the duty
owed to the stockholders to disclose the information as soon as
possible; and (2) the duty owed to the company not to disclose
any information without first investigating thoroughly the
accuracy of the information. In some cases, this choice can be an
extremely difficult one. While the director did not sell the stock
he himself owned to Asahi Seimei, Asahi Seimei would not have
purchased Daiwa Bank's stock if it had known of the negative
information. Therefore, as far as the director's duty of disclosure
is concerned, it is reasonable to assume that the case is similar to

the director's selling of his own stock to another stockholder

without disclosing the negative information. The Asahi Seimei
Case illustrates the difference in director's duties under United
States and Japanese law.
The disclosure duty under the common law in United States
is as follows: For liability to occur, (1) a party involved in a
business transaction must intentionally prevent another party
from obtaining an important piece of information by concealment
or otherwise, 39 or (2) a party must owe to another party a duty "to
exercise reasonable care to disclose matters known to him that
the other party is entitled to know because of a fiduciary or other
40
similar relation of trust and confidence between them."
Otherwise, it cannot be sued for fraud based on its failure to
disclose information. As to the fiduciary, however, the party has
not only an "affirmative duty of utmost good faith, and full and
duty
fair disclosure of all material facts," but also an affirmative
41
clients."
his
misleading'
avoid
to
care
reasonable
to 'employ

Id.
38.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 550 (1976).
39.
Id. § 551 (2)(a).
40.
SECv. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180, 194 (1963).
41.
In equity law, fraud includes all actions, omissions and concealment that cause
damages to other people, with violations of duties, trusts or confidence duly
placed under the common law or the equity law, or all actions, omissions or
concealment to deprive other people inappropriately and unconscientiously of
opportunities to make profits. Id.
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Under U.S. case law, it has been discussed extensively
whether a fiduciary relationship exists between a director and a
stockholder. It is clear under U.S. case law that such a fiduciary
relationship does exist between a director and a company when a
director buys the company's stock from a stockholder and takes
advantage of knowledge of internal information of the company.
Similarly, there exists the question of whether or not Daiwa Bank
had a disclosure duty with regard to Asahi Seimei, a stockholder,
in urging Asahi Seimei to buy shares from the market.
The "majority" rule is that, "officers and directors do not have
active
liabilities
for
disclosure
responsibilities
unless
misstatement, unclear representation, or intentional concealment
were made either verbally or by actions. However, since they
have fiduciary obligations to the company and the stockholders
with regard to trading with the company and for the company,
they have the disclosure duties."42 According to this rule, It is
fair to conclude that the directors of Daiwa Bank had a disclosure
duty in the Asahi Seimei case.
The "minority" rule states that "the insider (officers, directors,

and major shareholders owning more than 10% of the stocks) of a
company is construed to have a fiduciary relation with a
stockholder in a stock trading so that the former has to make a
complete disclosure on all important matters. ' 43 Based on this
standpoint, there is no question that a disclosure duty
exists for
44
those Daiwa Bank directors in the Asahi Seimei case.
Against this backdrop of U.S. common law, the securities
laws 4 5

contain

several

prohibitive

rules

against

fraudulent

42.
The leading case for this view is Carpenter v. Danforth, 52 Barb. 581
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1868).
43.
Oliver v. Oliver, 45 S.E. 232, 234-35 (1903); Stewart v. Harris, 77 P.
277, 279 (1904); Jacobson v. Yaschik, 155 S.E.2d 601, 605-06 (1967).
44.
A third theory on this matter is an intermediate position in that it
states that an insider owes a responsibility for non-disclosure in special
circumstances. Even from this standpoint, the disclosure duty of Daiwa Bank is
undeniable. For the third theory, see Strongv. Repide, 213 U.S. 419, 431 (1909).
The court held that the purchase of stocks from minor stockholders by a
dominant stockholder and administrative general without disclosing the pending
sale of a company asset, constituted an unlawful fraud. Its decision was based
on its finding that it was the defendants' duties to act honestly and disclose the
facts prior to said purchase, given the defendants' positions as Insiders and the
special knowledge they had. Id.
45.
United States Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-78mm (1934)
and The Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-78JJ (1934).
The Act of 1933 was intended to achieve "truth in securities" related to the public
offerings in the issuing market, while the Act of 1934 intends mainly to control
activities of brokers and dealers as well as the securities market where they
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activities; 46 in particular, they deem illegal an "insider's" use of
insider information in trading securities. Specifically, Section
10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 obligates certain
insiders, namely officers, directors, and major stockholders, to
pay the company any profit they earned on account of insider

information within the past six months. Whether such an action
is to be construed as "insider trading" is judged according to Rule
10b-5, a derivative rule of Section 10(b).
It is difficult to believe that the insiders of Daiwa Bank did
not trade Daiwa Bank's stock at all while important information
was being withheld. If there were any such trading, Rule lOb-5
should be applied. The directors of Daiwa Bank must have had
the choice "either to disclose the important information or to
abstain from trading."4 7 It must have been the same in the case
of asking Asahi Seimei to buy Daiwa Bank's stock from the
market. The particular director of Daiwa Bank must have had
the choice "either to disclose or not to ask for such a trade."
In the United States, the disclosure duty according to Rule
lOb-5 is not limited to the case of a direct deal between an insider
and a stockholder, but rather it imposes a wider duty on insiders
to urge the company to disclose fully any important information
that might influence the evaluation of the stock of the company
on the stock market. It seems that, although the responsibility of
disclosure by the company is stressed, the company's response is
generally slow and limited by its pursuit of its own interest. Thus,
the responsibility of disclosing to the general public seems to fall
on the insiders themselves.
There is no question that insiders will be charged with
violations of 10b-5 for distributing false information through
reports, newspaper releases, comments by directors, or any other
methods, even if they were not involved in any trading. 48 The
operate; at the same time, it established a disclosure system (Securities Report
System) that obligates them to disclose pertinent information continuously.
46.
The most Important ones are Section 17(a) of Securities Act of 1933
and Sections 9(a)(4) and 10(b) of Securities Exchange Act of 1934. These rules
determine that "the use of market maneuvering or fraudulent device or
contrivance related to the issuing, buying or selling securities is illegal."
47.
See supra note 33.
48.
In the Texas Gulf Sulphur case, where the focus of the lawsuit was a

misleading newspaper report describing a large mineral deposit found in Canada
as uncompromising, the Second Circuit Court stated in its final judgment that it
seems that it is not unfair to hold the management of a company to be
responsible to confirm the accuracy of any announcements the company makes
to stockholders or the general public. SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d
833, 861-62 (2d Or. 1968), cert. denied sub nom. Coates v. SEC and Kline v. SEC,
394 U.S. 976 (1969). In other words, the court delivered a judgment that rule
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question, however, is whether or not they will be convicted of
violating Rule lOb-5 when they fail to announce an important
piece of information that most likely would have affected the
market price. There is no Supreme Court case that deals with
this particular issue. Both the SEC49 and the U.S. courts5 °
consider it appropriate to temporarily withhold an important piece
of information from the market if there is a sufficient business
reason to do so. During the period the information is withheld,
neither the issuer nor insiders may conduct trading. If this
concept is applied to the Asahi Seimei case, Daiwa Bank's (or its
directors') request that the third party purchase the Bank's stock
is equivalent to doing the trading by itself, and thus, a court is
likely to find that it is not possible to conduct such trading legally
while withholding such information for a substantial period of
time.
Accordingly, leading stock exchanges in the United States
request listed companies to "quickly disclose any news or
information that is reasonably expected to provide a serious effect
on the securities market," and to "take actions to deny quickly
any groundless rumors that otherwise might cause abnormal
5
market reactions or price fluctuations." '
Taking these rules and regulations in the United States as
the premise, the Asahi Seimei case, in which a director of Dawa
Bank asked and actually made the third party buy the Bank's
shares, though acquired in the stock market, can be considered a
violation of the law because of its similarity to the case where an
insider would be involved in the transaction itself. In this case,
the insider was obligated to disclose the important information
known to him because of his position, but unknown to the other
party, which would have affected the other party's investment
judgment. In such a case, a clash is inevitable between the Rule
lOb-5 duty of a director to disclose important information as soon
as possible and the duty of a director under the common law not
to disclose information prematurely. If disclosure prior to the
buying or selling is inappropriate or unrealistic, then the only

10b-5 is always considered to be violated in a case such as follows: when an
announcement was made in a rationally calculated method in order to influence
the investing public, e.g., by media reporting financial status, and said
announcement was fraudulent or likely to cause misunderstanding or, so
imperfect as to cause misunderstanding, irrespective of whether the
announcement was motivated by a secret purpose of the officers of the company
or not. Id. at 862.
49.
Investors Management Co., Inc., 44 S.E.C. 633, 646 (1971).
50.
Dolgow v. Anderson, 438 F.2d 825, 829 (2d Cir. 1971).
51.
NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGE LISTED COMPANY MANUAL 202.
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choice left is to give up trading. Moreover, if it is proved that the
director not only failed to disclose such important information,
but also intentionally concealed it, there is a possibility that he
would be accused of violating both the general fraud prohibition
provision, Section 9(a)(4), which prohibits market manipulation,
and Rule lOb-5.
The present case, however, appears entirely different under
Japanese law. It is difficult under Japanese law to establish a
complaint against Daiwa Bank and its directors as to the nondisclosure of the important information. Although disclosing
fraudulent information is an offense under Japanese law as well,
failure to disclose information that would affect the stock price is
not an offense.
Based on the U.S. Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities
52
Exchange Act of 1934, the Securities and Exchange Law of
Japan contains a detailed rule on disclosures by corporations.
The Securities and Exchange Law of Japan is intended to protect
past and future investors in corporations by focusing on the
disclosure system. While rules of investor protection existed in
the Commercial Code, they did not sufficiently cover the

disclosure of corporate accounting.53 Therefore, the Securities
and Exchange Law was introduced as a supplement to secure
smooth and fair trading of securities as well as to protect
investors.

SH6KEN TORIHIKI H6 [Securities and Exchange Law], Law No. 25 of
52.
1948, translated in 3 INT'L SEC. REG. Japan Booklet 2, at 14 (1992) [hereinafter
Securities and Exchange Law]. Subsequent amendments to this law reflected
developments in the United States. The occupation authorities enacted the
Securities and Exchange Law at the end of the Second World War as a condition
for the reopening of the securities exchange market in Japan.
ShoH6 [Commercial Code], Law No. 48 of 1899, was modeled after
53.
German laws, while the Securities and Exchange Law was copied from the U.S.
laws after W.W.II. Germany is a civil law country, while the United States is a
country of the common law. Any confusion in the concept of disclosure in Japan
may be attributed to the slight difference in the disclosure rules of the two source
countries. For an examination of the development of the Japanese securities
market, see Mitsuru Misawa, Securities Regulation In Japan, 6 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L
L. 447 (1973). Further, as to the internationalization of the Tokyo Stock Market,
see Mitsuru Misawa, Tokyo as an International CapitalMarket-Its Economic and
Legal Aspects, 8 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 1 (1974). It is safe to say that, when the
loyalty of employees to the company is compared to their loyalty to the
stockholders, the latter is given priority in the United States, while in Japan, the
former is given priority. The loyalty to the company not to disclose prematurely is
a part of the traditional social system in Japan and the lifetime employment
system goes hand-in-hand with this loyalty. This loyalty given by directors and
employees to the company is one of the basic principles of the Commercial Code
of Japan.
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The Japanese law also prohibits insider trading, 54 as does
Rule 10b-5 of the U.S. Securities Exchange Act of 1934. However,
if an insider owns the stock of his own company under the name
of a third party or a fictitious person, voluntary reporting will
In addition to the fact that it Is
probably be meaningless.
practically impossible to detect the violation, the stipulation that
the director who benefited from the insider trading must return
the resulting profit to the company makes it difficult to expect any
significant effects, given the social custom of Japan, unless there
is an internal power struggle within management. Consequently,
it is very seldom that this Japanese insider trading rule Is
activated; it is considered essentially a dead letter, when
compared with U.S. law.
As a result, the question of whether or not a director of a
company has a duty to inform the other party about inside
information when trading his or her company's stocks has been
met generally with a negative answer. In fact, except in a clear
case of fraud, the contract will not be negated. A director will not
be obliged to indemnify the other party just because the director
failed to disclose a piece of inside information about the company
that the director came to know in the course of his or her work,
unless the other party asked the director to disclose such
information.
Moreover, a director will not be held legally
accountable for his or her company's nonfeasance in failing to
disclose important information, even if it was information that
could be reasonably expected to have a substantial influence on
the securities market according to this rule.5 5 Therefore, it is
impossible to label the responsibility of any particular director for
non-disclosure of the information in the Asahi Seimei case as a
violation of Section 189 of the Securities and Exchange Law of
Japan, which corresponds to Rule lOb-5 of the U.S. Securities
Exchange Act of 1934.
Even in Japan, however, the situation would be different if a
person is actively involved in concealing information, in addition
54.
Securities and Exchange Law, supranote 52, at 189.
55.
The disclosure of important information based on the request of the
stock exchange also is not uncommon in Japan as a follow-up procedure of
information already announced. After the incident was disclosed, the possibility
of merger between Daiwa Bank and Sumitomo Bank was rumored. In response
to this, the Tokyo Stock Exchange requested both banks to disclose information
in writing, but both banks responded by saying that "there is no specific merger
plan." Chairman of Tokyo Stock Exchange Asks for Disclosure if any Changes Exist
In Sumltoma Bank and Daiwa Bank Merger, NIHON KEIZAI SHIMBIJN, Nov. 22, 1995,
at 4 (Japanese-language source). The Tokyo Stock Exchange further asked both
banks to "disclose information as quickly as possible if any changes occur, since
the merger is expected to affect the stock prices." Id.

1996]

DAIWA BANK SCANDAL IN NEW YORK

to delaying its disclosure.
punishment
(Article 189
those cases
such action

1047

Although it is difficult to seek

based on violation of the Insider Trading Prohibition
of the Securities and Exchange Law of Japan), as
in the United States5 6 are not established in Japan,
as an illegal transaction
can probably be prosecuted
5 7

that violates the general fraud rule.

In essence, one must conclude that it is difficult to hold a
director in Japan legally accountable in these cases, unless the
failure to disclose important information is accompanied with

some fraudulent action such as concealment. While numerous
investors, in addition to Asahi Seimei, must have bought Daiwa
Bank's stock prior to the disclosure of the incident and incurred
damage due to the price drop of the stocks,5 8 there is no legal
59
remedy based on the Securities and Exchange Law of Japan.
The only way to obtain a remedy is to bring a derivative suit
under the Commercial Code,6 0 charging a violation of the duty of

See supra notes 49-50.
56.
57.
The Securities and Exchange Law of Japan also prohibits fraudulent
operations with Article 58 against illegal trading which corresponds to Article
17(a) of U.S. Securities Act of 1933 and against manipulation of the stock market
with Article 125 which corresponds to Article 9 of U.S. Securities Exchange Act of
1934. The difference between Article 58 and Article 125 is that Article 58 is a
comprehensive prohibition rule to prohibit all fraudulent actions in general while
Article 125 is intended to secure a free and open market. Due to the nature of
these tvo rules, it often happens that a case violates Article 125 and Article 58 at
the same time.
58.
Although MOF did not comment on the case of Asahi Seimei's
purchase of the stocks, it commented on the issuing of preferred stocks in Japan
by Daiwa Bank immediately before the incident was disclosed, saying that, "there
is no specific procedural problem in regard to the Securities and Exchange Law."
No Procedural Fault in Issuing Preferred Stocks After Confession of Former
Employees, MOF's Vice Minister Asserts, NIHON KEIZAI SHIMBUN, Oct. 6, 1995, at 7

(Japanese-language source).
59.
Daiwa Bank will install an internal proposal organization to promote
the disclosure of the management information by the end of 1995 as the result of
the experience. This is received as a progressive effort. In order to prevent any
recurrence of such an incident and to improve the transparency of the
management, an organization called "Action Direction Committee," a permanent
proposition organization consisting of outsiders, will be started. The committee
of other companies, scholars and
members include owner/operators
professionals, journalist, and general saving customers, totaling about 10 people.
The committee will discuss and propose, in addition to the issues of how
information disclosure should be handled, improvements of services to general
and
more informative
corporate
customers,
customers
and
saving
communications to the stockholders. Mechanism for Management Information
Disclosure Suggestions to be Installed In Daiwa Bank by Year End, NIHON KEIZAI
SHIMBUN, Oct 13, 1995, at 7 (Japanese-language source).
60.
See supranote 53.
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loyalty of the directors to the company. This method, however, is
currently not very effective in Japan.

As we have seen so far, there is a marked difference between
the United States and Japan regarding strictness in the pursuit of
disclosure duties of corporations. It is safe to say that an average
Japanese company has not felt a need to immediately disclose
important information, until now. As a lesson from the Daiwa
Bank case, it is important for Japanese banks to observe the
disclosure principle more stringently and to disclose pertinent
operating information to stakeholders, such as stockholders and
corporate customers, earlier, more quickly, more frequently, and
more thoroughly, rather than reporting it privately to authorities
such as the MOF. The more thoroughly Japanese banks conduct
disclosure, the higher their market evaluations will be.
By
assuming full and strict responsibility of management and
supervision, they will be able to regain the trust of the
61
international securities market.

V. IN PURSUIT OF THE MOF'S REPORTING RESPONSIBILITY

Aside from focusing on the attempts by Daiwa Bank to hide
losses, U.S. criticism has also targeted the closed-room
administrative practices of the MOF itself. Such criticism arises
from the MOF's failure to notify U.S. financial authorities for six
62
weeks after the MOF received its report from Daiwa Bank.
Sharp criticisms against the MOF are surfacing in the United
States one after the other, declaring that it was the MOF that was
really at fault in the matter rather than Daiwa Bank, since it
61.

The necessity for disclosure by Japanese banks is desired by a wide

range of international observers. For example, Kevin Mellyrin, a consultant, and
Arthur M. Mitchell, a lawyer, claimed that "filf Japan wants to develop world-class
financial institutions that are necessary to secure Its position in the world
economy, it is necessary for Japan to ask for a more thorough and consistent
disclosure practice from its banks." Self-Renovation of JapaneseBanks Desired
Urgently, NIHON KEIZAI SHIMBUN, Dec. 4, 1995, at 23 (Japanese-language source).

62.
It was August 8, 1995 when the president, an executive vice president
in charge of international operations and a managing director of Daiwa Bank met
with the Director General of the Banking Bureau of MOF at the bank's club to
report an illegal incident. In response, the Director General of the Banking
Bureau told the representatives of the bank that "it [was] bad timing,]" as
disclosure might trigger instability in financial circles, and kept the secret in his
pocket. It waited more than 40 days until September 18, 1995 when MOF finally
notified the U.S. authorities. MOF's Confusion at Its Peak; Distrust of Japan's
FinancialAdministration Heightens Regarding Daiwa Bank Scandal; Disbandingof
MOF is Suggested, SHUKAN ToYo KEIZAI, Dec. 2, 1995, at 16 (Japanese-language
source).
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failed to follow necessary procedures after receiving the report
63
from the Bank.
As mentioned before, Daiwa Bank was "obligated to report to
the FRB within 30 days after the criminal case was suspected,"
according to the Regulation H. 64 While the MOF's reporting duty
does not stem directly from this law, it should have advised Daiwa
Bank to report to the FRB. 65 The MOF is accused of being
morally responsible for this nonfeasance. Moreover, even though
there is no legal regulation to abide by, it is fair to say that, based
on what this law stood for, the MOF had a responsibility to report
this kind of information quickly to the FRB.
As to this implicit responsibility for the nonfeasance of the
MOF, there is a strong view among the informed sources in the
Japanese financial world that the MOF did not know about this
thirty-day disclosure duty under the U.S. IBA. 66 However, the
FRB and U.S. prosecutors do not think that this is true. 67 This
reporting requirement was created only four years ago based on

the experience of the BCCI affair, which shook the world.68 Thus,
it is difficult for them to believe that the MOF and Daiwa Bank,
which had been operating in the United States for many years,
did not know of it. Even if the MOF and the Bank did not know
about the law, it is well-known of the jurisprudence in Japan, as
well as that of the United States, that lack of knowledge of the law
does not disprove the existence of intent or mens rea. 69 Since the

63.

As an example, a Wall Street Journal article stated:

[Tihe real rogue is Japan's [MOF). In the Daiwa affair and in its handling
of Japan's banking crisis, the [MOF] has shown its remarkable
overconfidence and its willingness to bamboozle U.S. bank regulators, the
Japanese public and even itself... So maybe it wasn't surprising that the
[MOF] thought it could flout U.S. banking regulations this summer by
failing to report-for six weeks-what it had learned about Daiwa's illegal
trades in the U.S. The trades cost Daiwa $1.1 billion. But they cost the
[MOF] its reputation.
John Bussey, Japan'sBungling Ministry of Finance, WALL ST. J., Nov. 10, 1995, at
A14.
64.
See supra note 22.
65.
Suggestionfor Disbanding of MOF Surfaced Abruptly with Daiwa Bank
Scandal, SHUKAN TOYO KEIzAI, Dec. 2, 1995, at 12 (Japanese-language source).
66.
Id.
67.
Id.
68.
Id.
69.
"Ignorance of the law excuses no one (Ignorantia legis neminem
excusat)" is one of the basic principles of the common law in the United States.
In other words, everyone must know the ordinary laws of the country one lives in,
and ignorance thereof does not excuse oneself from being charged with either civil
or criminal liability. The same principle applies to the citizens of Japan. See
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FRB's opinion is that the "MOF neither disclosed important
information nor honored the reporting duty between the bank
supervising authorities of the two countries" and that It]hlis is a
breach of faith,"7 0 the expulsion of Daiwa Bank should be
understood as an indirect warning on the part of the FRB to the
MOF.
The characteristics of the response of the MOF to the Daiwa
Bank incident can best be described as obfuscation and delay,
which is the traditional technique of the MOF based on their
governing principle: "Never let them know; let them rely on us."
"Obfuscation" and "delay" as well as "secrecy" are the key words
often used these days in criticizing the Japanese financial system.
They are analogous to "equivocation" and are taken as a kind of
cover-up. All of these words suggest not an attitude of clarifying
the problem and solving it, but of attempting to make the status
and magnitude of the problem
fuzzier, which is a typical form of
71
"responsibility evasion."
This secrecy-prone administrative technique by the MOF has
72
severely damaged the international credibility of Japan.

Nevertheless, the MOF insists that this problem was created by
[Criminal Code], Law No. 45 of 1906, art. 38-3 [hereinafter Criminal Code]
(Japanese-language source).
70.
In the Senate Banking Committee's hearing on the Daiwa Bank
incident. Mr. Alan Greenspan, Chairman of the Federal Reserve Board (FRB), said
about MOF's delay in reporting to the U.S. authorities that "it is regretful that
MOF made this error," while Chairman of the Banking Committee, Senator
D'Amato, criticized MOF saying "MOF, which prevented the speedy report to the
U.S. authorities in a collusion with Daiwa, severely damaged the trust between
the two governments." MOF's Failuresare Regrettable, NIHON KEIzAI SHIMBUN, Nov.
29, 1995, at 2 (Japanese-language source).
71.
Another example that is causing criticisms against MOF from this
perspective is the "Jusen" problem. Although MOF claims that the interest-free
preferential credits of Japanese banks against Specialized Housing Finance
Companies (Jusen) is V40 trillion, the actual figure is rumored to be 770 trillion.
The U.S. authorities are irritated that MOF is not disclosing information in a
straightforward manner and have the impression that MOF is engaged in a cover
up, as in the Daiwa Bank case. See Nippon Island of Bad Debts, SHUKAN Toyo
KEIZAI. Feb. 24, 1996, at 12-17 (Japanese-language source).
72.
MOF has tried rebutting the criticisms regarding the delayed report on
various occasions. While MOF is trying to convince the world by saying "there is
nothing to be concerned about in the financial system," it has taken actions
which indicate that it is deeply concerned by the loss of it credibility.
For
example, after the announcement of the affair. MOF showed keen interests in how
it was perceived by overseas observers as exemplified by the Deputy Vice-Minister
holding an explanatory meeting in Washington D.C., and the special press
conference held by General Directors of Banking Business and International
Finance Bureau with foreign correspondents in Tokyo. See Outlandishness of
JapaneseFinancial System Revealed; MOF Agonizes as Its Rebuttals are Ignored,
NIHoN KEiZAi SHIMBUN, Oct. 18, 1995, at 3 (Japanese-language source).
KEIHO
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the "difference of culture between Japan and the [United
States]."7 3 and does not accept its fault, which is really the crux of
the problem.7 4
Such denial is similar to the fact that the
management of Daiwa Bank did not realize its duty to disclose the
important information at the earliest opportunity.
However, a "difference of culture" cannot be used to
rationalize negligence with regard to rules and violations.
International business is conducted under a certain set of rules
and develops when mutual trust deepens as agreements and
contracts are exchanged and honored. It became quite clear that
there is a marked difference between Japan and the United States

in the understanding of this principle.

The violation of the

reporting duty is a clear violation of a rule. The MOF clearly
shows how selfish the Japanese financial system is and how
difficult it is for it to be accepted internationally. In that sense,
the "Daiwa Bank problem" is a "Japanese problem" as well.
Of course, it goes without saying that it is essential to have
open communication and tight cooperation among countries in
order to maintain an international financial system. In an age of
progressively globalized finances, where money can be transferred
within a split second, mistrust between financial supervisory
authorities may lead to a financial crisis. We have to conclude
that the MOF's understanding of this point was too naive.
The root of this case is in the collaboration between the MOF
and the Japanese banking industry regarding the so-called
"administrative guidance," which is indistinct and secretive.
Such an administrative method delayed healing only to worsen
the damage.
When it became impossible to hold back the
information any more, and the truth was finally made public, a
huge irrevocable international and domestic loss of trust resulted.
Why then does the Japanese financial industry depend on the
"administrative guidance" of the secret room? Why does it not
want to act and take responsibility for its own acts?
73.
At a press conference held on September 18 for foreign correspondents
in Japan, MOF explained that "the problem resides in the difference of culture."
See Suggestion of Splitting MOF Surfaced Abruptly with Daiwa Bank Scandal; MOF,
Campaign of Bureaucracy, Shows Signs of Fatigue, SHUKAN Toyo KEIZAI, Dec. 2,
1995, at 16 (Japanese-language source).
74.
After Japan acknowledged that it had failed to notify American banking
authorities for six weeks after it learned of a $1.1 billion scandal at the Daiwa
Bank in New York, Treasury Secretary Robert E. Rubin and his Japanese
counterpart, Masayoshi Takemura, talked on Oct. 11, 1995 to air their

differences. Rubin's aides said that officials of Japan's MOF characterized the
conversation as apology, but Japanese officials said in Tokyo on Oct. 12 that no
apology had been proffered. Cloistered Japanese Banks, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 13,
1995, at Al.
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The first reason is that, since the end of World War II, there
have not been clear rules established for the financial world in
Japan under which it could act on its own operating principles
and take responsibility for its own activities. Rather, it had to
adhere to the murky rules of "administrative guidance," whereby
it was required to ask what the MOF's intentions are. In this
case, for example, there was no explicit rule saying that the Bank
had to report within a specific number of days after it learned
about such an incident. There was simply a guiding principle
that it had to be reported as soon as possible.
Secondly, the reason that such a secretive collaboration
between the administration and the industry, and its lack of
disclosure, lasted
so long are the existence of the so-called
75

"convoy system" -a

concept to approve the government backup

system as a desirable matter-and the increase in real-estate and
stock prices that continued to rise for years and years due to the
continuous expansion of the Japanese economy. Under such
conditions, it was easier for industry to obey administration
policy, as the profit would automatically flow in with the
expansion of the Japanese economy. Even if industry officials
made a mistake in managing the Bank, the damage would be
healed automatically by the rise of the real-estate and stock
market prices if they "kept their mouths shut" in collaboration
with the administration.
In fact, Daiwa Bank seems to have thought that it was
adequate to report the incident to the MOF and simply to obey the
guidance of MOF. The MOF, however, did not tell Daiwa Bank
what to do in this case. Thus, Daiwa Bank inadvertently broke
the IBA's reporting rule that an incident has to be reported within
thirty days after it was discovered, and as a result, Daiwa Bank
was expelled from the United States
Thirdly, from the international viewpoint, the Japanese
financial institutions, despite their limited international
experience, have quickly become giants in size during the last ten
years, mainly because of a sharp yen appreciation against the
U.S. dollar. Their holding increased twofold in terms of the dollar,
and the amount of funds they controlled increased sharply.
Thus, the Japanese financial institutions, big in size, but rather
primitive in international etiquette, felt that they had to depend
on the administration's guidance in order to compete among the
more sophisticated institutions of the world, which in comparison

75.

The treatment of Japanese banks by MOF is best understood by an

analogy to a convoy forming a large group consisting of warships, cruisers, and
destroyers to ride out rough seas and opposition.
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have survived years of tough competition and merger battles while
being responsible for their own acts.
The MOF's shallow
understanding of what the international financial system should
be was the true cause of the joint failure of the MOF, on whom
Daiwa Bank relied for guidance, and Daiwa Bank to comply with
U.S. law.
VI. GENERAL

IMPROVEMENTS FOR JAPANESE BANKING IN THE
INTERNATIONAL MARKET

What Japan needs is a fundamental overhaul of the Japanese
financial administration. Such an overhaul is necessary in order

for Japanese banks to be accepted with sufficient respect as a
partner of the other world banking institutions.
How can
Japanese banks be upgraded to an international level
qualitatively as well as quantitatively?
The first step should be to reduce government intervention by
terminating the secretive government administrative guidance
and openly documenting all rules in the form of statutes and
regulations. Once this is done, all financial institutions must
compete freely on their own initiatives by obeying the rules and
not relying on government administration. This means, from the
standpoint of the supervising authorities, that the authorities
should not interfere in financial operations, so long as the
financial industry is operating based on the predetermined rules.
The job of financial authorities should then be limited to
monitoring the industry by making sure there are no violations of
the rules and examining the financial institutions that operate on
licenses to see if their operations are healthy. If the authorities
find any violations through such monitoring and examination, the
violators should be punished according to a predetermined
objective standard. The financial institutions, on the other hand,
should actively disclose their assets without waiting for
monitoring or examining by the authorities.
In order to introduce these autonomous responsibility
principles and free market doctrine, it is necessary to minimize
government intervention and its control of industry. Toward such
an end, it is better to establish an independent organization in
order to monitor the market and enrich its functions. 76 As we
76.

As to this point, Japan can learn from the U.S. banking monitoring

system. Each element of the monitoring system in the United States, comprising
FRB, Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC), Office of Currency Control
(OCC). and the banking supervisory bureau of each state, operates strongly
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follow this scenario, we come to a possible disintegration of the
MOF. The problem is that too much power is concentrated in the
MOF. 7 7 That is one of the distant causes of the Daiwa Bank
incident.
One idea is to divide the MOF into several units,
including a Budget Agency (which would prepare the budget), a
Tax Agency (which would plan out the tax system and collect
taxes), and an Asset Management Agency (which would manage
the national assets among other responsibilities), and to establish
separate market-monitoring organizations, thus making the entire
78
organization more efficient.
Naturally, the MOF is expected to resist such a disintegration
plan and to try to maintain its existing organization; it seems that
the MOF is hoping to overcome the situation by simply beefmg up
the existing examination divisions in the ministry. 79
It is
questionable, however, whether such a patchwork solution can
really silence the surging voices that call for MOF reform.

independent of each other. A drawback of this system is the complexity which
stems from the overlapping jurisdictions of the independent elements. Although
there is no need for Japan to copy this U.S. system, the Daiwa Bank case
demonstrates, that Japan needs a strong, independent bank examination
organization consisting of professionals in lieu of the Banking Bureau, which Is,
after all, a part of the MOF.
77.
For example, MOF provides the securities market supervision, which Is
equivalent to the SEC's function in the United States. This is another reason why
MOF needs restructuring.
As to this point see Mitsuru Misawa, Loss
Compensation in the JapaneseSecurities Market- Causes, Significance, and Search
for a Remedy, 25 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 37, 53-55 (1992).
78.
The Administration Reform Project Team of the ruling coalition parties
has started the evaluation of a plan to absorb the examination and supervising
functions of the MOF's Banking, Securities and International Finance Bureaus
into an independent Financial Examination Agency to be newly established. See
SHUKAN ToYo KEIZAI, Nov. 11, 1995, at 2 (Japanese-language source).
79.
MOF has issued an enhancement plan for Its financial examinations
utilizing the existing means, such as Operations Improvement Orders and budget
approval procedures, in response to various criticisms It has received since the
Daiwa Bank case. In other words, although it has been handling the results of
the examinations through administrative guidance, It will mainly resort to
procedures such as administrative sanctions to satisfy the criticisms denouncing
the ambiguity of administrative guidance.
See MOF Tries to Maintain
Transparency of MOF and Avoid Disbanding of Organization Through Intensified
FinancialInspection and Administrative Measures, NIHON KEIZAI SHIMBUN, Dec. 1,
1995, at 7 (Japanese-language source).
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ENFORCING RESPONSIBILITIES OF DIRECTORS--THE DERIVATIVE
SUIT

Certain stockholders 8 0 brought suit in the District Court of
Osaka claiming $1.1 billion (YllO billion) in damages, caused by
the loss at the New York Branch of Daiwa Bank, against 38
defendants, including the former chairman of the board, former
officers, and the current president and officers of the Bank.8 1 The
Bank's stockholders originally requested Daiwa Bank's auditor
initiate an action against the management of the Bank within
thirty days, but the auditor refused to do so. As a result, those
stockholders decided to sue the Bank's directors themselves in
accordance with the Commercial Code. 82 The stockholder's claim
states the following:
Those directors of the bank failed to take proper measures; they
failed to discover the illegal trading by an E.V.P., who was a
temporary employee of the New York Branch, for an extended

period of time. Moreover, after the illegal operation was revealed by

the confession of said E.V.P., they concealed evidence and
repeatedly conducted Illegal operations, causing substantial
damage to the bank. These actions are the directors' violations of
83
their duty of loyalty to the company.

In response to the claim, Daiwa Bank was served an order to
be expelled from the United States by the FRB and has agreed to
it. It has been reported,8 4 however, that the Bank is going to
plead not guilty as to the twenty-four crimes, including fraud,
claiming that such conduct was not completed by the
organization. It is also expected that the Bank is going to plead
similarly in the case of the stockholders' representative action in
85
an effort to evade the responsibilities of its directors.
80.
Two individual stockholders and one corporation stockholder.
81.
Stockholder's Representative Action to be Filed Tomorrow Asking 1.1
Billion Dollars in Damages,NIHON KEIZAI SHIMBUN, Nov. 26, 1995, at 30 (Japanese-

language source).
82.
See supra note 53, arts. 267, 275-74.
83.
See Nikon Keizai Shimbun, supra note 79.
84.
The president of Daiwa Bank countered the attack by claiming, "[tlhe
bank is the victim," at a press conference. It seems what he was trying to say
was, "the bank was double-crossed by a trusted temporary employee of the bank
and is pursued with a supplementary action, a severe administrative action. Yet,
the bank has not caused any losses to befall its clients." NIHON KEIZAI SHIMBUN,
Nov. 22, 1995, at 4 (Japanese-language source).
85.
However, directors of Daiwa Bank will face a difficult situation in the
stockholders' representative action brought against them in Japan because Daiwa
Bank itself and Tsuda, the former director and general manager of the New York

Branch, have admitted their guilt regarding a number of the charges and agreed
to a plea bargain with the U.S. prosecutor. See supra note 12.
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The stockholders' representative action is a new form of
litigation introduced in United States which has not functioned
properly in Japan. 86
While the number of stockholders'
representative actions is increasing and several judgments have
been made in cases where the directors' responsibilities were at

issue, it is too early to say that the system operating such actions
has been well established.
The present $1.1 billion case is
drawing much attention from the business circles in Japan due to
the size of the claim. Examination of a few other more typical
cases appears below.
A. CaseA: Mitsui Mining Co., Ltd.

In a stockholders' representative action, the directors of

Mitsui Mining Co., Ltd.

87

were sued for damages caused by

having coerced its wholly-owned subsidiary into purchasing its

stock at a high price and then selling the stock to the Mitsui
Group at a lower price. The suit alleges that this action violated
the rule prohibiting the acquisition of a company's own stock.
The Supreme Court, finding that the acquisition of the stock of
their own company was a violation of the Commercial Code, 88
rendered a guilty verdict against the directors. 8 9 Although this
representative action requested the payment of Y100 billion
(approximately $1 billion), the Supreme Court supported the
It is almost certain that the plaintiffs in the stockholders' representative action
will use this plea bargain as indisputable evidence of the alleged wrongdoing of
the directors. While the opening arguments in the trial of the stockholders'
representative action are scheduled for May 1996, the defendants are expected to
argue whether the management decision was a correct one at the time of the
incident rather than debate the existence or lack of a malfeasance. In other
words, the defendants will argue whether the response of the directors to the
incident was "extremely unreasonable."
86.
In order to make this system function properly, a revision of the
Commercial Code was enacted in October 1993 containing: (1) a reduction of the
petition fee and (2) allowing plaintiff stockholders to petition for recovery of
litigation expenses from the company if the plaintiffs win. (Amendments to the
Commercial Code, June 14, 1993, No. 62) (Japanese-language source).
87.
A mining concern listed on the Tokyo Stock Exchange. Address: 2-1 1, Chuo-ku, Tokyo. Sales (1995): 249 billion yen. ToYo KEIZAI, JAPAN COMPANY
REPORT 48 (1996).
88.
According to the Commercial Code, supra note 53, a company is
prohibited from acquiring its own stocks (Jiko Kabushiki no Shutoko [Acquisition
of Own Stock] art. 210). Also, a subsidiary is prohibited from acquiring the stocks
of its parent company. The rule recognizes the oneness of the parent company
and a subsidiary and applies the rule to the transaction between the two. (Jiko
Kabushiki no Shutoku [Acquisition of Own Stock) art. 211-2).
89.
Ariyoshi v. Mitsui Mining Co., Supreme Court, Sept. 9, 1993, 1st Small
Court, 1989 (o) No. 1400 (Japanese-language source).
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judgment of the Second Tokyo High Court that found Y3.5 billion
(approximately $350 million) in damages.
B. Case B: Hazama-Gumi Ltd.
In a representative action requesting damages from a director
of Hazama-Gumi Ltd., 90 for a bribe paid to the mayor of Sanwamachi, Ibaragi-ken by the company, a guilty verdict was rendered
by the Tokyo District Court in December 1994. 9 1 The verdict
against the directors ordered them to pay Y14 million
(approximately $140,000) in damages, a sum equal to the amount
of the bribery. In delivering the verdict, the Tokyo District Court
ruled that: (1) using as a means of business a crime of a highly
unsocial nature, such as bribery, should not be tolerated; and (2)
bribery cannot be justified as a means of business simply because
it brings a profit to the company, it is difficult to get an order
without it (as competitors do the same), or it is customary in the
industry.92 The defendants did not appeal the case.
C. Case C: Nomura Securities
Before loss compensation procedures became illegal by the
Revision of 1991 of the Securities and Exchange Law, 9 3 Nomura
Securities 94 compensated such losses. In a representative action
seeking damages against the directors, the Tokyo High Court
supported the decision of the first trial by the Tokyo District
Court which did not hold the directors liable and rejected the
claim by the plaintiff.95 While it found that loss compensation is
96
an unfair trading method in violation of the Antimonopoly Law,
it also decided that the Antimonopoly Law does not fit with the

rules concerning the application of the Commercial Code with

90.

A general construction company listed at Tokyo Stock Exchange.

Address: 2-5-8, Minato-ku, Tokyo. Sales (1995): 522 billion yen. Toyo KEIZAI,
JAPAN COMPANY REPORT 76 (1996).

91.
Matsumaru v. Otsu, Tokyo District Court, Dec. 22, 1994, Civil Sec. No.
8, 1993 (wa) No. 18447 (Japanese-language source).
92.
Id.
93.
Securities and Exchange Law, supra note 52.
94.
A securities broker listed at Tokyo Stock Exchange. Address; 1-9-1,
Chuo-ku, Tokyo. Operating profit (1995): 335 billion yen. ToYo KEizAI, JAPAN
COMPANY REPORT 994 (1996).
95.
Ikenaga v. Tabuchi, Tokyo High Court, Sept. 26, 1995, 16th Civil
Dept., 1993 (ne) No. 3778 (Japanese-language source).
96.
Dokusen Kinshi H6 [Antitrust Law], Law No. 54 of 1947, art. 19
(Japanese-language source).
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regard to damage caused by a violation of the directors. 97 The
reason for this is that the party that receives the loss is not the
company, but the competitor. The decision also stated that the

loss compensation was within the normal boundaries of the
management's judgment, and neither the violation of the duty of
due care nor the violation of the duty of loyalty to the company
were found. 9 8 Thus, the directors were not liable.
D. Standardof Directors'Liability
The facts of these three example representative actions are
completely different.
By comparing these three decisions,
however, one can deduce the following standard of directors'
liability.
First of all, as the decision of the Tokyo District Court stated
in Nomura Securities:
(1) the management judgment of a
corporation is a comprehensive one requiring a professional,
predictive, policy-making judgment capability for analyzing
unpredictable, fluid, and complex factors, so that it tends to be
broad and complex; and (2) a court should examine the actual
management judgment of the directors itself from the standpoint
of whether there were any careless mistakes in examining the
facts that were used as premises, and whether the decisionmaking process based on the facts was not ffilogical. 9 9 In essence,
it seems that the court is trying to honor the management
judgment of directors as much as possible.
The court, however, considered that directors may be subject
to liability in certain situations. First, even if an act may be
viewed as an act indispensable for business reasons, the director
who committed the act may still be punished if it is an illegal act
for which a person can be sent to jail. In the above three cases,
bribery can be a criminal offense punishable by up to three years

of imprisonment under a Criminal Code, 100 and acquisition of
one's own company's stock can be a criminal offense punishable
by up to five years of imprisonment under the Commercial
Code.' 0 ' On the other hand, loss compensation conducted before
97.
Commercial Code, supra note 53, Kalsha ni Taisuru Sekinin
[Responsibilities to Company], art. 266-1-5.
98.
Tokyo District Court, Dec. 22, 1994, Civil Sec. No. 8, 1993 (wa) No.
18447 (Japanese-language source).
99.
Id.
100. Criminal Code, supra note 52, Zouwai, Assen Zouwal [Bribery,
Mediating Bribery], art. 198.
101. Commercial Code, supra note 53, Kaisha Zaisan wo Ayauku suru
Tsumi [Crime to Risk Company's Assets], art. 489-2.
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1991 is not a criminal offense punishable by imprisonment, and
no penalty rules are applicable to violations of the Antimonopoly
Law.
Second, assuming that an act is not a criminal offense,
directors will not be punishable simply because they caused a
loss to the company, if other directors in the same industry could
have made the same mistake.
Third, a director who performs a certain prohibited act or
fails to supervise another such a director; a director or auditor
who attended the board of directors meeting where the execution
plan for such an act was adopted; or an auditor who attended the
auditors meeting which examined such a plan may be liable.
E. Application of This Standardto the Daiwa Bank Case
Applying these principles, let us review the Daiwa Bank case.
In light of the first principle, if the court in New York decides that
the action of the directors stationed at the New York Branch at
the time of the incident is a criminal offense punishable by
imprisonment, then the same directors will be held liable in the
representative action in Japan as well. According to the third

principle, not only the directors who actually performed the
actions, but also the directors who failed to monitor the directors
who performed the actions, as well as the directors and auditors
who attended the board meeting at which the action was
approved face liability.
If such action is not a criminal offense punishable with
imprisonment, it should then be examined against the second
principle. In other words, if the action of the director that caused
a loss to the company is the type of action that would have been
performed by many directors in the same industry, the director is
not liable. The question is whether the action performed by the
directors stationed at the New York Branch can be considered to
be the kind of action that would have been performed by many
directors in the same industry. The answer to that question is
no; the present case is a very unusual case in view of the common
sense of the particular industry. Therefore, it will not be a
surprise if the directors are held liable, even if the action does not
constitute a criminal offense punishable by imprisonment.
In addition, in the Daiwa Bank case, responsibilities of the
directors will be evaluated from viewpoints that have never been
For example, is it reasonable to impose
considered before.
supervisory liability on the directors, who resided in Japan at the
time, when the incident occurred in New York? The general
sentiment of Japanese managers is that "directors who reside in
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Japan can not be held responsible for an incident that happened
at a place so far away." Even though it happened on foreign soil
so far away, it may still be reasonable for the stockholders to hold
the directors who resided in Japan responsible for a breach of
supervisory duty because of the length of time-eleven yearsthat they remained unaware of what was happening.
The Japanese should welcome the opportunity brought by the
judgment in the present case to think about the responsibilities of
directors in the expanding international environment and to
clarify these standards of responsibilities.

VIII.

ECONOMIC PENALTY PAID BY JAPANESE BANKS

A. The JapanesePremium
The phenomenon called the "Japanese premium," 10 2 which
means that Japanese banks-the banks of the largest creditor
nation in the world-are forced to pay interest rates
approximately 0.25% higher in the overseas market, is still
prevailing with no end in sight. This is because an increasing
number of foreign banks are reducing the funds supplied to
Japanese banks since Daiwa Bank announced its loss. The fact
that Daiwa Bank received an order of expulsion from the United
States is3 not helping end this special treatment of Japanese
0
banks.'
In addition to the Daiwa Bank case, a general distrust of
Japanese banks lies behind the Japanese premium.
Such
distrust arises from: (1) the lack of proper information disclosure;
(2) the limited supply of public funds that can be diverted to save
the financial institutions plagued with bad debts; (3) risks of bad
debts due to unclear accounting processes; and (4) risks of
unexpected loss disclosures.
A view that these problems

102. This is the premium the European and U.S. banks are asking in the
interbank market in London and New York when financing Japanese banks.
Even the highest ranking Japanese banks are asked to pay interest 0.25% higher
than the London Interbank Offered Rate (LIBOR) in case of Euro-dollar onemonth items. Premium Interests for JapaneseBanks Escalate In Europe, NIHON
KEIZAi SHIMBUN, Sept. 28, 1995, at 7 (Japanese-language source).
103. According to a forecast by the Sumitomo Life Insurance Research
Institute, the total loss by Japanese banks due to Japanese premium will amount
to Y250 billion ($2.5 billion) by the end of March 1996. For details, see Japan
Premium Causes 250 Billion Yen Loss of Profit, NIKKEI KINYU SHINBUN, Dec. 22,
1995, at 1 (Japanese-language source).

1996]

DAIWA BANK SCANDAL IN NEW YORK

1061

associated with Japanese banks are not transient, but rather
structural ones, has settled into the minds of people abroad.
Japanese banks had difficulty in raising funds from abroad
in 1974, just after the so-called "first oil shock." The Japanese
premium at that time reached 3% at its peak. The rate itself was
higher then than it is currently. However, if one compares the
total amount of short-term loans in question, it is about $250
to $10 billion then; thus, the problem is far
billion now compared
10 4
more serious now.
The problem then became liquidity (i.e., the credit shrinkage
of the Euro-dollar market). As a countermeasure to this Japanese
premium, the MOF introduced a regulation in 1977 which
stipulated that a certain portion of all long-term assets should be
funded by long-term loans.' 0 5 This operating/funding regulation,
however, was scrapped in the early 1980s, and it became the
norm for Japanese banks to obtain long-term loans for less than
10% of the long-term assets and to rely on short-term loans for
the rest. As a result, the increase in short-term funding costs due

to the Japanese premium at this time is reducing the lending
interest revenues of Japanese banks. The situation is more
serious at this time because, in addition to the above-mentioned
fundamental
problem, Japanese banks are plagued with such
6
issues as management problems and bad debts. 10

104. Dollar Shrinkage Leaves Deep Scar; Tectonic Movement in International
Finance Market; Clearly Showing Unreasonable Nature of Japan Premium, NIHON
See Infra Figure 5 (Japanese-language
KEIZAi SHIMBUN, Nov. 24, 1995, at 1.

source).
105.
106.

Id.
Id.
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Fig. 5 Comp arison of Japanese Premiums
1974
Cause
*
Closing of
Helmschtadt Bank
(West Germany)
Effect
*
Interest gaps
widened depending on
rating and names due
to shrinkage of Euromarket's credits
creating functions
Purpose of
*
Settlement of oil
foreign fund
purchase cost
raising
Short term
foreign
currency

*

$10 billion

[Vol. 29:1023

1995
Management
failures in Japanese
financial institutions
*
Only Japanese
banks are burdened
with penalizing
interests with no
regard for rankings
and names
*
Funds for
international
investment and
financing
*
$250 billion
*

obligations

B. Effect of the JapanesePremium
The Japanese premium is economically unreasonable. Japan
has an enormous surplus in the trade balance. In order for a
country with a negative trade balance to keep trading,10 7 the
country with a surplus trade balance has to keep financing the
country with a deficit trade balance. The United States has a
negative trade balance vis-a-vis Japan. Also, the United States
has a deficit in the current balance, so that it has to compensate
for the deficit with a smooth capital return flow, i.e., a flow of
funds from Japan, which has a high foreign currency reserve, to
the United States, which has a low reserve. 10 8 Thus, Japan is a
large creditor of the United States.
Japanese banks, the banks of the largest creditor country,10 9
have to pay higher interest than others to borrow the currency of

107.
108.
109.

See infra Figure 6.
See Infra Figure 7.
See Infra Figure 8.
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the United States, the largest debtor country; such interest
In that sense, it is
differential is the Japanese premium.
unreasonable. The reason that Japanese banks are paying this
high penalty is because banks in other countries expressed
distrust about Japanese banks-a distruct that was reinforced by
the Daiwa Bank case. Thus, the Daiwa Bank case was a regretful
incident and caused profound damage for all Japanese banks.
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Fig. 8 Japan's Capital Outflow (1989-1993)
(US $ million)

1989
1990
1991
1992
1993

Long-Term
Capital
-89,246
-53,080
-31,390
-30,780
-78,336

Short-Term
Capital
45,830
35,140
-103,240
-75,770
-14,426

Total
-43,416
-21,540
-71,850
-106,550
-92,762

(-) indicates outflow.
Note:
Source: KEIZAI KOHO CENTER, AN INTERNATIONAL COMPARISON. 47
(1995) (Japan) (Japanese-language source).

The Japanese premium is expected to continue for some time,
because it will be difficult to wipe away the distrust of Japanese
banks.
Moreover, Japanese banks will encounter some
fundamental problems in raising funds from the international
market. Specifically, there are three mismatches in the fundraising by Japanese banks:
(1) there is more lending than
deposits (lending/deposit mismatch); (2) shorted amounts have
been raised in the short-term interbank loan market and applied
to long-term assets (short-term/long-term mismatch); and (3)
assets and debts have been actively accumulated in foreign

currencies, such as U.S. dollars rather than yen, although the
yen is the basic currency for Japanese banks (currency
mismatch). As a result, while Japanese banks have credits of
$481.2 billion (approximately Y 48.12 trillion) against
corporations overseas, the amount raised by stable means, such
as borrowing from banks, is only $177.5 billion (approximately Y
17.75 trillion)." 0 In other words, they are operating an amount
three times larger than the amount raised by stable long-term
means, and the shortage of fund-raising is covered with shortterm funds.
The Japanese premium can be viewed as reflecting the risks
In that sense, the
associated with such mismatched deals.
Japanese premium will not disappear until the contents of fund
trading of Japanese banks-that is, their management attitudeschange. Although higher-ranking banks with high credibility can
110. Japan Premium, How Will it End?, NIHON KEIZAI SHIMBUN, Nov. 6, 1995,
at 43 (Japanese-language source).
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continue international operations despite the Japanese premium,
trust banks and local banks will have difficulty maintaining their
operations because of negative spreads. In essence, it is expected
that overseas assets of Japanese banks will be reduced.
If Japanese banks reduce overseas assets, however, it may
cause worldwide credit shrinking.
The lending balance of
Japanese banks in the United States has reached 9.4% of total
lending. Additionally, these banks hold $400 billion in Treasury
bonds."II
Since 1986, Japanese institutional investors have
1 12
purchased 9.3% of all newly issued U.S. Treasury bonds.
These investors have been aggressively buying U.S. Treasury
bonds for their high liquidity in preparation for tough times,
partly because of the guidance of the Bank of Japan.' 1 3 If the
raising of foreign currency becomes difficult, Japanese banks will
probably start cashing in the Treasury bonds. If that happens,
long-term interests in the United States will increase rapidly, and
U.S. stock prices will go down.
In order to prevent world-wide credit shrinking and deflation,
the United States has to provide sufficient liquidity and fill this
gap temporarily as the last provider of dollars. The FRB recently
set up a system to supply short-term funds to Japanese banks
against collateral of Japanese foreign currency reserves. 114 This
was not only because the FRB was concerned about the effects of

the collapse of Japanese banks on the United States, but it was
also based on the concern about the possibility of worldwide
credit-shrinking, as mentioned above." 5

IX.

CONCLUSION

Economic relations between Japan and the United States
have been rough in recent years due to the trade imbalance
problem.
Various disagreements in thinking were exposed
between the two countries in the Daiwa Bank case. This incident
provided a new and serious impact on relations between the two
countries.
The central issue of this incident is not that an employee of
Daiwa Bank engaged in illegal operations, nor is it the huge loss
that those operations caused. Those things occur often in both

111.
112.
113.
114.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

115.

Id.
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countries, and such a thing cannot cause such a profound
impact. The real problems are that Daiwa Bank failed to report to
U.S. authorities and that the Bank covered up its losses for a long
period of time. Moreover, the MOF failed to notify the U.S.
authorities quickly after it was contacted by the Bank. These
delays are the reason why the United States is calling the
Japanese activities "a serious betrayal of the trust between the
United States and Japan."' 1 6 A further problem is that the
Japanese, including the MOF, seem to lack any awareness that
they may be at fault. "There was no mishandling of the matter,"
said the MOF. ' The reason the Americans are upset stems from
the cultural difference between the two countries." 117
This difference in perspective between the two countries
makes this case more complex and multifaceted. It includes an
essential problem that cannot be brushed away as a difference of
culture. A wide discrepancy exists between the two countries in
the way the laws regarding the disclosure system of corporate
information are applied. It is mandatory for U.S. corporate
management to "disclose important information in the earliest
possible chance." 18 However, it is quite different in Japan. It is
generally thought that a disclosure should be made at a carefully
selected, proper timing. Even the MOF considers matters in this
way. This misconception between the two countries is really the
largest factor that caused this case and created the difference in
the perceptions of the seriousness of the matter between the two
countries. As a result of that misconception, the handling of the
matter by the Japanese was extensively criticized.
Japanese industries should clearly understand that their
legal interpretations, as well as people's conceptions and manners
of dealing with various matters, while acceptable in Japan, may
not necessarily be correct in the United States It is common
sense that, as long as one wishes to conduct business in the
United States, one should obey the rules of the United States In
Japan, we have our own version of the saying, 'When in Rome, do
as the Romans do.' This important realization was missing from
Daiwa Bank and the MOF.
Japanese companies operating overseas today are all
perplexed with a question: to what extent their Japanese way of
thinking, i.e., Japanese management style, should be implanted

116.

See NIKON KEIZAI SHIMBUN, supranote 70.

117.
118.

See SHUKAN ToYO KEIZAI, supra note 73.
See New York Stock Exchange Listed Company Manual, supra note 51.
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into their overseas subsidiaries. 11 9 The backdrop to that dilemma
is that, although the Japanese management style was highly
thought of at one time, more criticisms of it are arising, especially
in foreign countries, with the demise of the Japanese economic
120
boom.
The present case clearly shows us how far it is possible to
press the Japanese way of thinking and way of handling matters
overseas. It is a great lesson, which teaches Japanese companies

that there is a limit in applying their management styles on

foreign soils. This is especially true of Japanese companies who
are undergoing internationalization. It has been nearly ten years
since the full-scale internationalization of Japanese industries
started. As international corporations, they have gone from being
"infant industries" and are now entering the age of maturity. The
present case is arguably something Japanese companies are
destined to experience as they mature into full-fledged
multinational corporations.
Because of this incident, Japanese banks are paying a hefty
intangible penalty, namely the loss of trust in the international
market. They are also paying a more concrete penalty as well, the
"Japanese premium." This penalty against Japanese banks will
eventually be born by all Japanese industries. It is necessary for
Japanese industries to have a positive attitude and accept these
legal, economical, and social penalties, and not try to repel them.
Instead, these industries must learn the lessons needed for them
to grow further and make a new start. It is also necessary for
Japan to rethink the relation between the government and
industries, which we have taken for granted until now, and to
make necessary changes in our thinking. Restructuring of the
excessively large government may be necessary.
The Japanese people must have the modesty to analyze this
case thoroughly through multiple approaches and learn whatever
there is to be learned. On the other hand, the American people
should not repel Japan simply by labeling them "different," but
rather understand better the standpoint of the Japanese people
and industries who are in the midst of a process of
internationalization. Americans should study how the Japanese
thought and reacted in this case and should try to understand
119. For the difference of the management styles, see Mitsuru Misawa, New
Japanese-Style Management in a Changing Era, COLUM. J. WORLD Bus., Winter
1987, at 9.

120.

For a recent criticism of Japanese management styles, see Mitsuru

Misawa, Portrait of the International Entrepreneurs (Interview with Japanese
Business Leaders in the United States), SEKAI SHUHO [World Weekly] 44-45 (Jan.
31, 1995) (Japanese-language source).
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the Japanese legal, economical, and sociological situations as
well. It is desirable, for the further improvement of relations
between these two countries to create a consensus regarding

international

business

between

them

through

mutual

understanding. In that way, we can find some consolation in this
extremely regretful case. As we say in Japan, it is not impossible

to turn bad luck into good luck.

